


# HITLER'S

★ Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War ★

# SHADOW



Richard Breitman  
and Norman J.W. Goda



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Cover: U.S. Army sign erected by destroyed remains in Berlin.  
*RG 111, Records of Office of the Chief Signal Officer.*

# CONTENTS

Preface vi

Introduction 1

CHAPTER ONE | **New Information on Major Nazi Figures**

5

CHAPTER TWO | **Nazis and the Middle East**

17

CHAPTER THREE | **New Materials on Former Gestapo Officers**

35

CHAPTER FOUR | **The CIC and Right-Wing Shadow Politics**

53

CHAPTER FIVE | **Collaborators: Allied Intelligence and the  
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists**

73

Conclusion 99

Acronyms 101

# PREFACE

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In 1998 Congress passed the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act [P.L. 105-246] as part of a series of efforts to identify, declassify, and release federal records on the perpetration of Nazi war crimes and on Allied efforts to locate and punish war criminals. Under the direction of the National Archives the Interagency Working Group [IWG] opened to research over 8 million of pages of records - including recent 21<sup>st</sup> century documentation. Of particular importance to this volume are many declassified intelligence records from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army Intelligence Command, which were not fully processed and available at the time that the IWG issued its Final Report in 2007.

As a consequence, Congress [in HR 110-920] charged the National Archives in 2009 to prepare an additional historical volume as a companion piece to its 2005 volume *U. S. Intelligence and the Nazis*. Professors Richard Breitman and Norman J. W. Goda note in *Hitler's Shadow* that these CIA & Army records produced new “evidence of war crimes and about wartime activities of war criminals; postwar documents on the search for war criminals; documents about the escape of war criminals; documents about the Allied protection or use of war criminals; and documents about the postwar activities of war criminals”.

This volume of essays points to the significant impact that flowed from Congress and the Executive Branch agencies in adopting a broader and fuller release of previously security classified war crimes documentation. Details about records processed by the IWG and released by the National Archives are more fully described on our website *iwg@nara.gov*.

William Cunliffe, Office of Records Services,  
National Archives and Records Administration

# INTRODUCTION

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At the end of World War II, Allied armies recovered a large portion of the written or filmed evidence of the Holocaust and other forms of Nazi persecution. Allied prosecutors used newly found records in numerous war crimes trials. Governments released many related documents regarding war criminals during the second half of the 20th century. A small segment of American-held documents from Nazi Germany or about Nazi officials and Nazi collaborators, however, remained classified into the 21st century because of government restrictions on the release of intelligence-related records.

Approximately 8 million pages of documents declassified in the United States under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act added significantly to our knowledge of wartime Nazi crimes and the postwar fate of suspected war criminals. A 2004 U.S. Government report by a team of independent historians working with the government's Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group (IWG), entitled *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*, highlighted some of the new information; it appeared with revisions as a 2005 book.<sup>1</sup> Our 2010 report serves as an addendum to *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*; it draws upon additional documents declassified since then.

The latest CIA and Army files have: evidence of war crimes and about the wartime activities of war criminals; postwar documents on the search for or prosecution of war criminals; documents about the escape of war criminals; documents about the Allied protection or use of Nazi war criminals; and documents about the postwar political activities of war criminals. None of the

declassified documents conveys a complete story in itself; to make sense of this evidence, we have also drawn on older documents and published works.

## The Timing of Declassification

Why did the most recent declassifications take so long? In 2005–07 the Central Intelligence Agency adopted a more liberal interpretation of the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. As a result, CIA declassified and turned over to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) additional documents from pre-existing files as well as entirely new CIA files, totaling more than 1,100 files in all. Taken together, there were several thousand pages of new CIA records that no one outside the CIA had seen previously.

A much larger collection came from the Army. In the early postwar years, the Army had the largest U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence organizations in Europe; it also led the search for Nazi war criminals. In 1946 Army intelligence (G-2) and the Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) had little competition—the CIA was not established until a year later. Even afterwards, the Army remained a critical factor in intelligence work in central Europe.

Years ago the Army facility at Fort Meade, Maryland, turned over to NARA its classified Intelligence and Security Command Records for Europe from the period (approximately) 1945–63. Mostly counterintelligence records from the Army's Investigative Records Repository (IRR), this collection promised to be a rich source of information about whether the United States maintained an interest in war crimes and Nazi war criminals.

After preserving these records on microfilm, and then on a now obsolete system of optical disks, the Army destroyed many of the paper documents. But the microfilm deteriorated, and NARA could not read or recover about half of the files on the optical disks, let alone declassify and make them available. NARA needed additional resources and technology to solve the technological problems and transfer the IRR files to a special computer server. Declassification of these IRR files only began in 2009, after the IWG had gone out of existence.

This new Army IRR collection comprises 1.3 million files and many millions of pages. It will be years before all of these Army files are available for researchers.

For this report we have drawn selectively upon hundreds of these IRR files, amounting to many thousands of pages, which have been declassified and are already available at NARA.

## Intelligence Organizations and War Crimes

American intelligence and counterintelligence organizations each had its own *raison d'être*, its own institutional interests, and its own priorities. Unfortunately, intelligence officials generally did not record their general policies and attitudes toward war crimes and war criminals, so that we hunted for evidence in their handling of individual cases. Despite variations, these specific cases do show a pattern: the issue of capturing and punishing war criminals became less important over time. During the last months of the war and shortly after it, capturing enemies, collecting evidence about them, and punishing them seemed quite consistent. Undoubtedly, the onset of the Cold War gave American intelligence organizations new functions, new priorities, and new foes. Settling scores with Germans or German collaborators seemed less pressing; in some cases, it even appeared counterproductive.

In the months after the war in Europe ended Allied forces struggled to comprehend the welter of Nazi organizations. Allied intelligence agencies initially scrutinized their German intelligence counterparts for signs of participation in underground organizations, resistance, or sabotage. Assessing threats to the Allied occupation of Germany, they thought first of Nazi fanatics and German intelligence officials. Nazi officials in the concentration camps had obviously committed terrible crimes, but the evidence about the Gestapo was not as striking. The Allies started by trying to find out who had been responsible for what.

## NOTES

1 Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe, *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

(15) When did you first and last see Rattenhuber during the escape from the chancellery? What did he say about the fate of Bormann? What else do you know, or have you heard, about the of Bormann and Stumpfegger?


ANSWER: I went north by foot, hoping to come into unoccupied German territory, but until the 15th everything was still occupied by Russians and made it impossible to get into the American Zone

I continued to wander along the demarcation line, and also there I could not pass the Russians. Then I went back to Berlin, where a woman had offered an apartment to me.

On my refuge in the vicinity of Berlin in the little spot Bykwitz on approximately the 15th May I met the Chauffeur of Hitler, Sturmabannführer Kempka in civilian clothes. He told me that he had left with a smaller group together with Bormann, Dr Naumann, and Dr Stumpfegger the Reichschancellery later than I did. When crossing the Weidendamm Bridge the enemy fire was so strong, Kempka told me, that many died. An armored car, in which Bormann, Naumann and Stumpfegger tried to cross the bridge, received a full target shell, just before Kempka wanted to jump on it. He was thrown back, was blind for a short time, and saw, after he had gained consciousness, that Bormann and Stumpfegger were lying dead in their blood. I do not remember whether he claimed that Naumann was dead too.

3. For your information.

Tel Garmisch Mil 160, 161

  
KARL SESSMANN  
Special Agent, CIC

Gertrude (Traudl) Junge, one of Hitler's personal secretaries, stayed in the Reichschancellery bunker to take Hitler's last will and testament before his suicide. Junge describes the perils in working her way through the Russian lines surrounding Berlin. She relates meeting Hitler's chauffeur Kempka and of the deaths of Martin Bormann, Stumpfegger, and Naumann, when their armored car was blown up.

RG 319, Records of the Army Staff.

# CHAPTER ONE

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## New Information on Major Nazi Figures

Newly released Army records yield bits of intriguing information collected by the Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) after the war about some leading officials of the Nazi regime. The new information tends to confirm rather than change what historians have known about leading Nazi functionaries and their postwar fates. At the same time, it provides sharper focus than before.

### **New Interrogations of Hitler's Personal Secretary**

Gertraud (Traudl) Junge, Adolf Hitler's secretary starting in January 1943, took the dictation for Hitler's final testaments on April 29, 1945, the night before Hitler committed suicide. On May 2, 1945, she fled Hitler's bunker in Berlin with a small group, trying to move through Soviet lines to safety. The Soviets captured her on June 3. They imprisoned and interrogated her in their sector of Berlin. She left Berlin and went to Munich in April 1946.

Junge's recollections are an important source for Hitler's final days in the bunker. Soviet intelligence took great pains to confirm Hitler's death amidst persistent rumors that he was still alive, as did Allied investigators.<sup>1</sup> (Soviet interrogations of Junge have not yet surfaced.) On her return to Munich she gave many statements, most of which are well known to scholars. They include a series of interviews in Munich by U.S. Judge Michael Musmanno in February and March 1948 when Musmanno was investigating the circumstances of Hitler's

death.<sup>2</sup> She also wrote a personal memoir in 1947, made available to scholars in Munich's Institute for Contemporary History and published in 2002.<sup>3</sup> She gave testimony to German authorities in 1954 as well as numerous interviews to journalists in the years after the war, most famously in a 2002 German documentary film titled *Im toten Winkel* (Blind Spot). She died the same year at age 81.

On June 9, 1946, the CIC Field Office in Starnberg arrested Junge in Munich, and CIC agents interrogated her on June 13 and June 18. On August 30, CIC agents interviewed her a third time at the request of British intelligence, this time with 15 specific British questions. These summer 1946 interrogations are not cited in scholarly works on Hitler's final days. Possibly released here for the first time, they contain occasional detail and nuance that the other statements do not, because they were Junge's first statements on returning to the West.

In the first session Junge recalled Hitler's personal habits, confirming, albeit in new language, what is well known. She recounted Hitler's withdrawn behavior after the German military defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943, his insistence that Germany's miracle weapons would end the Allied bombing of German cities, and his belief that Providence protected him from the July 20, 1944, assassination attempt. Junge remembered Hitler saying that if Claus von Stauffenberg, the leader of the conspiracy, would have shot Hitler face to face instead of using a bomb, then von Stauffenberg would at least be worthy of respect. This interrogation also confirmed the death of Nazi Party Secretary Martin Bormann by Soviet shelling in Berlin. Hitler's chauffeur Erich Kempka witnessed Bormann's death and told Junge about it shortly afterwards. In July 1946 Kempka gave the same story to the International Military Tribunal.<sup>4</sup> At the time many people thought that Bormann escaped and fled to South America. His remains were not discovered until 1999.<sup>5</sup>

The second interrogation provides new detail on Junge's attempted escape from Berlin after Hitler's death, her arrest by the Soviets on June 3, 1945, and her repeated interrogations by the Soviets concerning Hitler's suicide. The Soviets were also interested in any connections Junge might have to existing Nazi networks; they hoped to use her to uncover them. In September 1945, an unnamed Soviet official offered Junge his personal protection including an apartment, food, and money. In return, Junge was to cooperate with Soviet forces and not to tell anyone

of her former or present job. She was not to leave the Soviet sector; but after she contracted diphtheria, she was allowed admission to the hospital in the British sector. On leaving the hospital, she said, “the Russians did not take any more interest in my person.” She left for Munich and arrived on April 20, 1946.<sup>6</sup>

Her third interrogation benefited from the direct questions from the British. Junge noted that Hitler hoped to delay his suicide until receiving confirmation that the couriers carrying copies of his last political testament had reached their recipients, namely Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, whom Hitler appointed head of state, and Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner, whom he appointed army commander-in-chief. With the ring closing around his Berlin bunker, Hitler would not allow the Soviets to take him alive. But he knew Dönitz, whose headquarters was near the Danish border, and Schörner, whose headquarters was in Czechoslovakia, would fight until the last cartridge and hang as many deserters as need be. “Hitler was uneasy,” recalled Junge, “and walked from one room to another. He said that he would wait until the couriers had arrived to their destinations with the testaments and then he would commit suicide.”<sup>7</sup> The couriers were not able to leave the Berlin area.

The British were also very interested in Hitler’s Gestapo chief, Heinrich Müller, who would have offered a treasure trove of counterintelligence information on the Soviets. Allied counterintelligence officers failed to locate him after the war. Some leads placed him in Berlin at war’s end and others suggested that he had fled south. The absence of an arrest or even a corpse led to later conspiracy theories that Müller worked for either Allied or Soviet intelligence. The bulk of the evidence, pieced together over the next quarter century, indicates that Müller was killed in Berlin during the war’s final days.<sup>8</sup>

Junge was asked directly: “On what occasions did you see Mueller in the Bunker? What do you know of his movements or activities during the last days?” Junge did not know Müller personally. She noted that she saw him for the first time on April 22, 1945. “Mueller remained in the shelter until Hitler’s death,” she said. “I ... observed him talking some times (sic) with Hitler ...” Junge continued, “I do not know any details about his activities. He had taken over the functions of [Reich Security Main Office Chief Ernst] Kaltenbrunner ...”<sup>9</sup>

At the time of Hitler’s suicide, Kaltenbrunner was in Salzburg. He had searched for a negotiated peace through various channels while also hoping that

an Alpine front could keep Germany from defeat.<sup>10</sup> What Hitler knew of these efforts in late April 1945 is not clear. But in his political testament he expelled Heinrich Himmler from the Nazi Party owing to Himmler's contacts with the Allies. Hitler promoted Karl Hanke, the fanatical Gauleiter of Lower Silesia who defended Breslau at the cost of some 40,000 civilian lives, to Himmler's office of Reichsführer-SS. Kaltenbrunner was logically the next in line for Himmler's job. Junge's statement suggests that Hitler lost trust in Kaltenbrunner, that Müller remained loyal to the end, and that Hitler trusted in his loyalty.

### **New Documents: Arthur Greiser's Briefcases**

Arthur Greiser, Nazi Gauleiter of the German-annexed portion of western Poland called the Warthegau, was a major war criminal by any standard or definition. Once conquered by the Germans in 1939, the Warthegau region was to be emptied of Jews and Poles and settled with ethnic Germans. The Warthegau also included the Lodz ghetto—the second largest in occupied Poland—and the extermination facility at Chelmno where Jews were first gassed to death. Thus, Greiser helped to implement Nazi policies that killed tens of thousands of expellees as well as more than 150,000 mostly Jews in Chelmo itself.<sup>11</sup> The U.S. Army captured Greiser in Salzburg on May 17, 1945, and extradited him to Poland. Using documents and witness testimony, a Supreme National Tribunal in Warsaw tried and convicted him in June and July 1946. He was hanged in mid-July.<sup>12</sup>

When Greiser fled west in 1945, he carried with him two briefcases filled with documents, mostly dealing with his activities during the 1930s and his personal affairs. Either he left behind or destroyed documents that connected him with policies of mass murder in the Warthegau, or what he kept of those documents went to Polish authorities. Still, the U.S. Army retained more than 2,000 pages of Greiser's documents in the Investigative Records Repository that only now are declassified.<sup>13</sup>

Some of the most interesting documents involve Greiser's activities, from November 1934 and afterwards, as president of the Senate of the international free city of Danzig. This post made Greiser chief executive of a German-dominated municipal government frequently in conflict with the Polish state

that surrounded it. How far to push these conflicts provoked discussion and debate among the highest Nazi authorities in Berlin.

Greiser wrote memoranda of his discussions with Hitler, Hermann Göring, Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath, his successor Joachim von Ribbentrop, and others. The documents show conflicting views in Berlin about how best to deal with the Poles and the League of Nations. Hitler and the Nazi Party Gauleiter of Danzig, Albert Forster, often wanted confrontation; Göring and Greiser, a more moderate course. Political disagreements help to explain the bitter personal rivalry between Greiser and Forster. Greiser's documents do not challenge the reigning historical consensus about these matters, but they do fill in the narrative. They also underscore—as historians have long argued—that Danzig's foreign policy was made in Berlin.<sup>14</sup>

In 1939 Hitler used conflicts over Danzig as the pretext for Germany to invade Poland. After the war, the Allies decided to charge high Nazi authorities with crimes against peace; the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg made crimes against peace the central count of four charges against high Nazi officials and organizations; the others were war crimes, crimes against humanity, and conspiracy. The Greiser file contains new evidence about the background to German aggression against Poland and thus about war crimes.

## **The Search for Adolf Eichmann: New Materials**

Today, the world knows a great deal about Adolf Eichmann's escape from Europe after the war. While he was living in Argentina under the name of Ricardo Klement, Eichmann worked with the Dutch writer Willem Sassen to prepare a memoir of sorts. In it Eichmann talks extensively about his escape from Germany. After Israeli agents brought Eichmann to Israel in 1960, the authorities interrogated him rigorously. Historians have used these plentiful sources as well as earlier IWG declassifications.<sup>15</sup> The most recent American declassifications fill in some small gaps. They show what the West knew about Eichmann's criminality and his postwar movements. No American intelligence agency aided Eichmann's escape or simply allowed him to hide safely in Argentina.

Die Unklarheiten über die Zahl der getöteten Juden.

Anlässlich einer Unterhaltung mit (SS-Obersturmbannführer) Eichmann (etwa im Herbst 1944 - in Budapest erzählte mir dieser, dass er einen Bericht für Himmler machen musste mit genauen Zahlenangaben über die bisher getöteten Juden. Nachdem er selbst die eigentlichen Vernichtungskommandos nicht unter sich habe ( was auch insoweit richtig ist, als Eichmann in ganz-Europa nur die Deportationen der Juden leitete bzw. organisierte ) sei er auf Schätzungen angewiesen gewesen, wobei er zu der Zahl von 4 000 000 gekommen sei, die in den sogenannten Gaskammern und anderen systematischen Vernichtungsapparaturen umgekommen seien, während er die Zahl der darüber hinaus getöteten Juden auf etwa 2 000 000 veranschlug, wovon die Masse bei der Besetzung Polens und Russlands durch eigene Sonderkommandos den Tod durch Erschiessen fand. Himmler war mit diesem Bericht Eichmann's sehr unzufrieden und liess ihm mitteilen, dass er ihm den Leiter seines Statistischen Büros schicke, der aufgrund seiner Unterlagen das Material neu bearbeiten würde. Himmler liess bei seiner Antwort klar erkennen, dass ihm die Gesamtzahl von 6 000 000 ermordeter Juden zu gering sei und er in einem Bericht nachweisen wolle, dass die Zahl höher sein müsse.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2000 2006

The ambiguity over the number of Jews killed

On the occasion of a conversation with SS-Obersturmbannführer Eichmann - approximately in the autumn 1944 - in Budapest he told me that he had had to make a report for Himmler with the exact number of Jews killed thus far. Since he himself did not have the actual killing units (*Vernichtungskommandos*) subordinate to him (which is also to that extent correct, as Eichmann led and/or organized only the deportations of Jews throughout all of Europe), he was dependent on estimates, whereby he had come up with the number of 4,000,000 which died in the so-called gas chambers and other systematic means of destruction, while he determined that the number of the Jews killed above and beyond that at approximately 2,000,000, most of whom were shot during the occupation of Poland and Russia by the special detachments (*Sonderkommandos*). Himmler was very dissatisfied with Eichmann's report and he ordered that the records be sent to the head of his statistical office so that work could be started anew. Himmler's response clearly indicated that he believed that the total number of 6,000,000 murdered Jews was too low and that he wanted the report to prove the number must be higher.

In 1944, six months before the end of the war, Eichmann reported to Himmler on the exact number of Jews killed so far as 6,000,00—4,000,000 in the death camps and an additional 2,000,000 by the death squads in Poland and Russia. Hoettl reported Himmler was dissatisfied with the report, asserting the numbers must be higher. RG 263, *Records of the Central Intelligence Agency.*

Wartime information emanating from the anti-Nazi informant Fritz Kolbe tied Eichmann to the Theresienstadt camp and to the use of Hungarian Jews for slave labor.<sup>16</sup> In addition, Jewish sources had early postwar information about Eichmann, which they passed to the Allies, but much of it was of poor quality, reflecting myths that Eichmann or others close to him had spread. One July 1945 report called him Ingo Aichmann with an alias of Eichman, and claimed he had been born in Palestine in 1901. What Jewish officials knew was that Eichmann had arranged transport of Jews from Holland, Denmark, and Hungary.<sup>17</sup> This unevaluated report and others like it helped establish Eichmann's importance at a time when his name was little known among Allied authorities. Hungarian Jews who had survived, such as Rudolph Kastner, could have given plentiful information about Eichmann's activities in Hungary. But they had no idea where Eichmann was.

Gestapo official Rudolf Mildner noted Eichmann's skill as a mountaineer and gave the Army a list of his possible hiding places in the mountains: either in the Dachsteingebiet or the Steiermark and Salzburg area. The Army sent out an early October 1945 notice that it wanted Eichmann urgently for interrogation and possibly for trial as a war criminal.<sup>18</sup>

In late October 1945, OSS sources indicated to the Army that Eichmann might be hiding in the Steiermark or Salzburg areas. Special Agent John H. Richardson asked local Austrian police in Salzburg to arrest Eichmann and turn him over to the CIC.<sup>19</sup> Although the CIC in Austria had no files on Eichmann of its own, it passed along sketchy, mostly accurate information from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces files.<sup>20</sup> The Research Office of the United Nations War Crimes Commission issued an October 1945 report on Eichmann that reached the Judge Advocate General's office. It contained some detail about Eichmann's wartime activities.<sup>21</sup>

In November 1945 the Counter-Intelligence War Room in London issued the first substantial Allied intelligence report on Eichmann, drawn from interrogations of a number of captured Nazi officials who had known him. It offered a physical description and a reasonable account of his career, calling him a war criminal of the highest importance. It included what he had told other Nazis about the number of Jews murdered by the Nazis and places he and others might hide if the war were lost. The report gave details about Eichmann's family and revealed the identity of one of his mistresses.<sup>22</sup>

Today we know that near the end of the war Eichmann had gone to the village of Altaussee in Austria. On May 2 he had met with his superior, Ernst Kaltenbrunner. More or less according to Kaltenbrunner's instructions—Kaltenbrunner probably did not want to be caught with Eichmann—he then retreated into the mountains to hide. But then he left. After a visit to Salzburg, he tried to slip across the border to Bavaria. American forces arrested him, apparently in late May. At first, he used the identity of a corporal named Barth, but after his SS tattoo was recognized and U.S. Army officers poked holes in his story, he transformed himself into Otto Eckmann, a second lieutenant in the Waffen-SS. The Army soon sent him to a POW camp at Weiden, where he stayed until August 1945. Then he was moved to another POW camp at Ober-Dachstetten in Franconia. Some Jewish survivors came to this camp to pick out known war criminals, but Eichmann managed to avoid recognition. (The Army established a file on an Otto Eckmann, but it is one of a small percentage of IRR digital files that cannot be retrieved.) While the Counter-Intelligence War Room alerted Allied forces in Europe about Eichmann's importance, he was hiding under a pseudonym at an American camp.<sup>23</sup>

In January 1946 the CIC recognized that Eichmann was partly responsible for the extermination of six million Jews, requested his immediate apprehension, and suggested close surveillance of his mistress, who owned a small paper factory in a village in the Austrian Alps.<sup>24</sup> Renewed war crimes interrogations of Eichmann's associate Wilhelm Höttl and Eichmann's subordinate Dieter Wisliceny convinced prosecutors that Eichmann was still alive. They asked the CIC to search for him in and around Salzburg. The CIC did so, but he was long gone from the region.<sup>25</sup>

In December 1945 the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had raised the subject of the Nazi extermination of Jews. American prosecutors presented and discussed an affidavit by Wilhelm Höttl, who said Eichmann had told him that the Nazis killed approximately six million Jews—the first time this statistic had appeared. A major article in the *New York Times* brought the name Adolf Eichmann to millions of people.<sup>26</sup> Then Eichmann's subordinate Dieter Wisliceny testified in-depth, adding much detail about Eichmann and his office.<sup>27</sup>

Hearing about the publicity about him, Eichmann decided to break out of the American camp and reinvent himself as Otto Henninger, a businessman. He ended up in the British zone of Germany, where he leased some land and raised chickens. By the late 1940s the British had no interest in further war crimes trials. But when Eichmann heard that Nazi war crimes hunter Simon Wiesenthal had instigated a raid on his wife's home in Austria in 1950, he decided to make use of old SS contacts to go to Argentina.<sup>28</sup>

In 1952 the Austrian police chief in Salzburg asked the CIC whether it still sought Eichmann's arrest. An official of the 430th CIC detachment in Austria noted that Wiesenthal, described as an Israeli intelligence operative, was hunting Eichmann and was offering a large reward. In a memo to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the CIC noted that its mission no longer included the apprehension of war criminals, and "it is also believed that the prosecution of war criminals is no longer considered of primary interest to U.S. Authorities." On these grounds, the Army should advise the Salzburg police that Eichmann was no longer sought. But in view of Eichmann's reputation and the interest of other countries [Israel] in apprehending him, it might be a mistake to show lack of interest. So the CIC recommended confirming continuing U.S. interest in Eichmann.<sup>29</sup>

In 1953 New Jersey Senator H. Alexander Smith acting on behalf of Rabbi Abraham Kalmanowitz, a leading figure in the Orthodox Jewish rescue organization known as Vaad Ha-Hatzalah, asked the CIA to make an effort to find Eichmann. Kalmanowitz viewed him as a threat to world peace. The memorandum by the Chief of CIA's Near East and Africa Division, subunit-2, was cleared by CIA General Counsel Larry Houston and stated: "while CIA has a continuing interest in the whereabouts and activities of individuals such as Eichmann, we are not in the business of apprehending war criminals, hence in no position to take an active role in this case; that we would, however, be alert for any information regarding Eichmann's whereabouts and pass it on to appropriate authorities (probably the West German Government) for such action as may be indicated."<sup>30</sup>

By then, contradictory rumors speculated that Eichmann was currently in Egypt, Argentina, or Jerusalem, and falsely ascribing his place of birth to the latter city. Some CIA reports unknowingly confused Adolf Karl Eichmann with Karl

Heinz Eichmann, who reportedly was in Cairo or Damascus. Indistinguishable among these false rumors assembled by West German intelligence was unconfirmed but accurate information concerning a “Clemens” in Argentina.<sup>31</sup>

In March 2010 the international press noted that the German intelligence service, the BND, had a classified file of some 4,500 pages of documents on Eichmann, purportedly about Eichmann’s escape to Italy and then Argentina.<sup>32</sup> American IRR records and CIA records on Eichmann may supplement or serve as a check on these German files once they are released.

## NOTES

- 1 The effort by British intelligence is covered in Hugh Trevor Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), and subsequent reprints. The Soviet effort is discussed in Henrik Eberle and Matthias Uhl, ed., *The Hitler Book: The Secret Dossier Prepared for Stalin from the Interrogation of Hitler’s Personal Aides* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).
- 2 Michael A. Mussmano Collection, Duquesne University Archives and Special Collections, Pittsburgh, PA, FF 25, Folder 32.
- 3 The English translation is Melissa Müller, ed., *Until the Final Hour: Hitler’s Last Secretary* (New York: Arcade, 2004).
- 4 Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Junge, Gertraud, June 13, 1946, NARA, RG 319, IRR Junge, Traudl, XA 085512. For Kempka’s testimony, see International Military Tribunal *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946* (Nuremberg: IMT, 1946), vol. 17 (hereafter *TMWC*), pp. 446ff.
- 5 Richard Overy, *Interrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands* (New York: Viking, 2001), pp. 113–14.
- 6 Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Junge, Gertraud, Interrogation Report No. 2, June 18, 1946, NARA, RG 319, IRR Junge, Traudl, XA 085512. The account of her escape here is at odds in many respects with that given in 2001 to Melissa Müller. See Müller, ed., *Final Hour*, pp. 219–27.
- 7 Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, August 30, 1946, Interrogation of Junge, Gertraud, NARA, RG 319, IRR, Junge, Traudl, XA 085512.
- 8 Timothy Naftali, Norman J.W. Goda, Richard Breitman, Robert Wolfe, “The Mystery of Heinrich Müller: New Materials from the CIA,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, v. 15, n. 3 (Winter 2001): 453–67.
- 9 Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, August 30, 1946, Interrogation of Junge, Gertraud, NARA, RG 319, IRR, Junge, Traudl, XA 085512.
- 10 Peter Black, *Ernst Kaltenbrunner: Ideological Soldier of the Third Reich* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 244–52.
- 11 Figure in Patrick Montague, *Chelmno and the Holocaust: A History of Hitler’s First Death Camp* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011).
- 12 On Greiser, see Catherine Epstein, *Model Nazi: Arthur Greiser and the Occupation of Western*

- Poland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Alexander V. Prusin, “Poland’s Nuremberg: The Seven Court Cases of Poland’s Supreme National Tribunal,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, vol. 24, no. 1 (2010): 1-25. We are grateful to Epstein and Prusin for their assistance. Epstein contributed to this section of our report.
- 13 Files relating to Greiser’s materials amount to 2,126 pages in all. See NARA, RG 319, IRR Greiser, Arthur, XE 000933A; NARA, RG 319, IRR Greiser, Arthur: Contents of Notebooks, XE 000933.
- 14 Greiser’s biographer Epstein, professor of history at Amherst College, had seen other copies of some of these documents in other archives; however, she had never before seen a substantial part of this evidence.
- 15 In just the last few years British historian David Cesarani has written a scholarly biography of Eichmann, and writer Neil Bascomb has described in colorful detail the Allied and Israeli search for Eichmann. David Cesarani *Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes and Trial of a “Desk Murderer”* (New York: De Capo Press, 2006); Neil Bascomb, *Hunting Eichmann: How a Band of Survivors and a Young Spy Agency Chased Down the World’s Most Notorious Nazi* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2009).
- 16 The Benzberg and Theresienstadt Concentration Camps, and Conscripted Jewish Labor from Hungary, NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 432, WN# 16464 and 16460.
- 17 Ingo Eichman, July 27, 1945, NARA RG 153, E 144, B 83. This document was declassified long ago.
- 18 Headquarters USFET Military Intelligence Service Center, September 25, 1945, re: Eichmann, Adolf, NARA, RG 319, IRR Mildner, Dr. Rudolf, D 00880; Sassard Memo re: Eichmann, Adolf, October 9, 1945, NARA, RG 319, IRR Eichmann, Karl Adolf, XE 004471.
- 19 This document is reprinted in Bundespolizeidirektion Salzburg to CIC, March 24, 1952, NARA, RG 319, IRR Eichmann, Karl Adolf, XE 004471.
- 20 NARA, RG 319, IRR Eichmann, Karl Adolf, XE 004471.
- 21 Material Related to SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann, October 1945, NARA, RG 153, E 144, B 90.
- 22 Werner Goettsch, Wilhelm Höttl, Kurt Auner, and Wilhelm Waneck were the main sources. Counter Intelligence War Room, London to Major Stewart, November 19, 1945, NARA, RG 319, IRR Eichmann, Adolf MSN 52577.
- 23 Bascomb, *Hunting Eichmann*, 19–23, 37–38, 42–43; Cesarani, *Becoming Eichmann*, 202–3.
- 24 CIC Central Registry, Summary of Information, January 10, 1946, NARA, RG 319, IRR Eichmann, Adolf, MSN 52577.
- 25 Office of Chief of Counsel to Maj. Thomas K. Hodges, CIC, March 21, 1946; Robert J. Brown, Special Agent, CIC to Officer in Charge, June 27, 1946, re: Eichmann, Adolf, NARA, RG 319, IRR Eichmann, Adolf, MSN 52577.
- 26 “Trial Data Reveal 6,000,000 Jews Died,” *New York Times*, December 15, 1945, p. 8.
- 27 *TMWC*, v. 4, pp. 354ff.
- 28 Cesarani, *Becoming Eichmann*, 203–205.
- 29 Disposition Form, Eichmann, Adolf, March 31, 1952, NARA, RG 319, IRR Eichmann, Karl Adolf, XE 004471.
- 30 Berle to Dulles, September 28, 1953; Kalmanowitz to Dulles, September 30, 1953; NE-2 to Dulles, October 20, 1953, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 30, Adolf Eichmann Name File, vol. 2, part 1.
- 31 This section on the CIA’s knowledge of Eichmann is adapted from a longer report by Robert Wolfe, “Did the CIA Really Cold-Shoulder the Hunt for Adolf Eichmann?” National Archives Research Papers, [www.archives.gov/iwg/research-papers/eichmann.html](http://www.archives.gov/iwg/research-papers/eichmann.html).
- 32 [www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,682826,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,682826,00.html).

Early in 1945 Cehsin Ret WELCHERS, head of Pol VII, told REKOWSKI that he had reached an agreement with Raschid Ali EL GAILANI to be put into effect 1 Apr 45. It provided that all sums paid by the Reich to EL GAILANI were to be repaid after the conquest of Iraq. Beginning 1 Apr 45, probably under provisions of the same contract, the monthly cash payments to EL GAILANI were to be raised to RM 85,000. REKOWSKI does not know if this increase was ever approved by the Foreign Minister; nor does he know if a similar agreement was reached with the Grand Mufti or whether the contract of 1941 remained in force unchanged.

By decree of the Foreign Office both Arab leaders enjoyed equal standing and were treated as potentates. Since all their expenses were paid by Germany, they used the monthly cash payments, certainly large parts and possibly all of them, to support their Arab followers. EL GAILANI maintained an office solely for the purpose of paying his followers and thereby prevented his men from going directly to the Foreign Office.

The following Arabs in Germany were supported by EL GAILANI: Kamil EL GAILANI, Jemil SULEYMAN, M.; SALMAN of the Iraqi Army Hikmet SAMI, and the widow and two children of the executed former Air Minister of Iraq, Mehud SALMAN.

The Grand Mufti, Amin EL HUSSEINI, supported his Staff consisting of two other HUSSEINI's (fnu), Dr JANDALI, Dr TAKIL, and Dr ALIMAJER, as well as the Islamisches Institut in BERLIN and a number of other Arabs unknown to REKOWSKI.

The foreign exchange funds received by both leaders were used to support appr 150 students in PARIS and some Arabs living outside of Germany, and to finance trips abroad to purchase articles not easily obtained in Germany.

The Foreign Office made monthly payments directly to Prince Mansour DGUD (RM 1,000), Junus BAHRI (RM 600), the Cheriff CHARAF (RM 1,000), Dr Tahib MASSER (RM 750), Fauci EL KAUCI (RM ?), and to the Minister of War of Iraq, name unknown, then living in VIENNA. The last name may have been Ibrahim PASDIA. Tahib MASSER also received a monthly sum (RM 750), from Rundfunk VII.

REKOWSKI learned from Dr SCHÖNBERGEL, head of Presse VII, a subordinate division of Dept VII of the Foreign Office, that Chekib ARSLAN received payments from Presse VII for his contributions to the magazine La Nation Arabe. REKOWSKI does not know the amounts or the methods of paying. The magazine was printed in French and dealt with Arab questions of a political nature. It was planned as a monthly publication of Presse VII but appeared infrequently or irregularly because not enough suitable writers could be found.

b. German Intentions Towards the Arab Countries

Through casual conversations with Dr GROBBA, REKOWSKI learned that the German plan was to charge the Mufti and EL GAILANI with the establishment of pro-German governments in their respective countries and to exploit these countries in due time. The currency to be used under the new regime in Iraq was printed in Germany as early as 1942, and a set of new uniforms was ready for Raschid Ali EL GAILANI.

German financial support of Arab leaders during the entire war was astonishing. The Grand Mufti Amin el Husseini and Raschid Ali El Gailani financed their operations with funding from the German Foreign Ministry from 1941-45. German intention in the Arab countries was based on an expectation of establishing pro-German governments in the Middle East. RG 319, Records of the Army Staff.